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INTRODUarION
Feminist writers have had difficulty finding an appropriate place
for the concept of responsibility, probably because it can mean so
many different things. Responsibility can refer to blame or fault, as in
being "held responsible" for past harm. It can also refer to the capac-
ity or ability to make constructive choices, as in "taking responsibilit'y"
for one's well-being or for the prevention of future harm. Feminists
have focused primarily on the first definition, minimizing the assign-
ment of responsibility to women in an effort to avoid blame or fault
for harms committed by men. In this sense, victims of sexual harass-
ment, for example, are not responsible for the harms they suffer, and
they should have access to legal protection or relief regardless of their
own behavior. If gender oppression limits the ability of women to act
* Associate Professor, University of Florida College of Law.
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independently and effectively in resisting or preventing these harms,
then the victim's conduct should be irrelevant.
The negative side of minimizing responsibility in women, how-
ever, is that lack of responsibility is all too close to irresponsibility. If
gender oppression limits the ability of women to make independent,
autonomous choices on their own behalf, then it also limits the ability
of women to make the most responsible, constructive choices. Here
the second definition of responsibility becomes important. If victims
are not responsible with respect to the harms they suffer, does that
also mean victims have a limited capacity to take responsibility for
themselves by responding constructively to oppressive circumstances?
A number of writers have considered the dilemma that victimiza-
tion and responsibility create for women, and they have generally re-
lied on the theory of "partial agency" in resolving the conflict.'
Agency is a broad concept that encompasses an individual's capacity
for independent decision-making and ability to choose, to refuse, and
to consent 2-essentially all the personal ingredients required for the
exercise of responsibility. For women, however, agency "is necessarily
partial or constrained" because women "are limited by structures or
1 See Kathryn Abrams, Complex Claimants and Reductive Moral Judgments: New Pat-
terns in the Search for Equality, 57 U. PrIT. L. REV. 337, 348-50, 361 (1996) [hereinafter
Abrams, Complex Claimants]; Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L.
REv. 761, 795-800 (1990) [hereinafter Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices]; Kathryn
Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
304, 324-29, 343-46 (1995) [hereinafter Abrams, Sex Wars Redux]; Kathryn Abrams,
Songs of Innocence and Experience: Dominance Feminism in the University, 103 YALE L.J.
1533, 1552-57 (1994) (book review) [hereinafter Abrams, Songs of Innocence]; Martha
R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hear-
ings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1305-18 (1992); Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40
UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1428-31 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing:
Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S Rrs.
L. REP. 195, 220-22 (1986) [hereinafter Schneider, Describing and Changing]; Eliza-
beth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice
in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520, 548-67 (1992) [hereinafter Schneider,
Particularity and Generality]. But see Sherry Young, Getting to Yes: The Case Against Ban-
ning Consensual Relationships in Higher Education, 4 Am. U.J. GENDER & L. 269, 292-301
(1996) (criticizing characterization of women as lacking in agency).
2 See Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 306 (defining agency as "capacity
for self-definition and self-direction"); Id. at 306 n.1 1 (defining agency as "the ability
to develop and act on conceptions of oneself that are not determined by dominant,
oppressive conceptions"); Id. at 326 (defining agency as "capacity to exercise mean-
ingful choice in the direction of her own life"); Schneider, Particularity and Generality,
supra note 1, at 549 (defining agency as "autonomy, individual action, individual con-
trol, and mobility").
3 Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 306 n.11 (emphasis added).
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relationships of oppression."4 "It is remarkably difficult, in the face of
contemporary findings on rape, sexual harassment, and the wage gap
or work/family conflict, to conclude that women enjoy, and should be
represented by feminists as enjoying, uncompromised powers of self-
determination.
'5
Partial agency is a best-of-both-worlds approach that first empha-
sizes that women, given the circumstances of gender oppression, can-
not fairly be held to legal standards that assume a person with full and
independent agency. "[WIomen must contend with-and are not
presently capable of completely disarming, either collectively or indi-
vidually-structures and practices that operate to deny or mitigate
that capacity."
'6
The dilemma of denying women's agency is, of course, that it cre-
ates a picture of the "wholly dominated victim,' 7 one completely inca-
pable of doing anything to improve her lot in life. Partial agency
attempts to avoid that extreme characterization by balancing the
"backdrop of ... systematic, gender-based oppression"s with specific
descriptions of the limited forms of agency that women do exercise
despite oppression. The hope is that greater attention to women's
acts of resistance, even if those responses might not be the ones cho-
sen by a person exercising full agency, will counteract the suggestion
that victimization leaves women helpless to do anything to improve
their lives.
Their response is to highlight, in the course of describing women's
oppression, those incidents of self-direction that emerge in the lives
of systematically oppressed women. This approach seeks to ac-
knowledge the limited but salient instances of resistance and re-
sponsibility that occur in that context, and to prevent the
emergence of legal doctrines that add stigmatizing representations
to the oppressions that women already endure.9
But does it work? Is it constructive-or is it counterproductive-
for women to characterize themselves as limited by their partial
agency? What kind of responsibility does partial agency give to, or
take from, women? Does partial agency only establish that women are
not responsible for the behavior of men, or does it also suggest wo-
men are unable to take the responsibility necessary to improve their
own lives?
4 Id, at 366.
5 Abrams, Ideolog and Women's Choices, supra note 1, at 779.
6 Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 306 n.11.
7 Id. at 366.
8 Id. at 333.
9 Id. at 344.
1998]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
There may be no one answer to these questions that applies to all
women under all circumstances. Legal scholarship has examined par-
tial agency largely in generalities; little attention has been paid to its
application in the context of any specific institution. 10 This Article
takes that step and will test the productiveness of describing women as
limited agents in the context of the United States military.
Although the military is a very separate" and little understood
community, it is currently subject to enormous public scrutiny with
respect to its treatment of women. The military now seems inextrica-
bly connected to the advancement of women, with the success of mili-
tary women a measure of the progress of women in general. As a
result, oddly enough, the military can serve as an excellent testing
ground for feminist theory. If the notion of partial agency could be
effective in advancing the status of military women, it would probably
also advance the interests of women more generally. If, however, the
notion of partial agency would work to the detriment of military wo-
men, we should at least reconsider the theory's general utility.
Part I of this Article contains an in-depth factual description of
the nature of military duty and responsibility, using a nuclear-weapons
assignment as a representative example of the working environment
for military women.12 This degree of factual specificity has been, un-
fortunately, almost uniformly absent from scholarly accounts of wo-
men's agency. Until feminist theory is applied in the context of
specific institutions, it will be impossible to determine whether inten-
tionally portraying women as limited by partial agency will ultimately
undermine women's equality. If, for example, descriptions of women
as agency-diminished are fundamentally inconsistent with the full
agency required in order to successfully perform certain military tasks,
10 See Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, supra note 1, at 794-95 ("Little schol-
arship in this area has focused on the generation of these [ideologically influenced]
attitudes among women, or, perhaps more importantly, on the relationship between
ideological influence and institutional patterns and practices."); Kathryn Abrams, So-
cial Construction, Roving Biologism, and Reasonable Women: A Response to Professor Epstein,
41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1021, 1037-38 (1992) [hereinafter Abrams, Social Construction]
("[S] ocial and institutional influences should be spelled out.").
11 SeeJames M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Ser-
vicemen's Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177 (1984).
12 From 1979 to 1983, I served as an aircraft maintenance officer and as a muni-
tions maintenance (weapons storage) officer at Air Force bases in the United States
and overseas. Both positions involved responsibility for the safety of nuclear weapons,
as do many Air Force positions. Coincidentally, the stateside squadron to which I was
assigned, the 319th Field Maintenance Squadron, is the same B-52 bomber mainte-
nance squadron chronicled in Judith Stiehm's well-known volume on women in the
military. SeeJuDrTH HicKs STIEHM, ARMS AND THE ENLISTED WOMAN app. A (1989).
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the theory of partial agency may unintentionally demote women to
second-class servicemembers.
Part H examines agency theory in the context of sexual harass-
ment law. Sexual harassment issues have been at the core of the re-
cent scrutiny of the status of military women, creating a novel
opportunity to examine the intersection of a number of concepts
which relate to the law's expectations for women. Issues of agency,
choice, responsibility, and blame have previously been intertwined in
a way that prevented constructive evaluations of women's conduct
under oppressive circumstances. This Part identifies parallel weak-
nesses in partial agency theory and in feminist criticisms of the "wel-
comeness" element in sexual harassment law, and offers in their place
a definition of responsible behavior that better advances women's
equality.
Part III expands on that new conception of responsibility and ex-
amines its application under specific factual circumstances of women
and the workplace, including the military workplace. The key to de-
vising an effective standard of responsible behavior is to realistically
identify the agency that women do exercise under different factual
circumstances, without unnecessarily diminishing that agency in a way
that is counterproductive to equality. In the end result, the law
should never validate behavior-by either men or women-that con-
tributes to women's inequality in the long term.
I. WOM:EN's AGENCY IN THE MILITARY
One of the more frustrating aspects of the recent media focus on
women in the military is the false impression of novelty it creates. Wo-
men always seem new, at the bottom of any ladder of rank or influ-
ence; women represent change, doing things that only men have
done before; and men's misconduct is usually attributed to all this
newness and change, a demonstration of their resentment at now hav-
ing to share the military with women colleagues. This spurious nov-
elty, however, exists mostly in the minds of those who have had few
occasions to notice military women in the past,'
3
13 Novelty, I suppose, is what makes news news. During the Persian Gulf War, for
example, reporters never tired of writing stories about military mothers with young
children. Although these military mothers would be disproportionately lower in rank
and tenure than military women in general, they were disproportionately featured as
bearing the burden of women's military service. I always wondered how the cameras
avoided showing the rest of the women, the ones who had been performing the same
distinctly non-novel duty for years.
1998]
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Civilian society has grown increasingly distant from military soci-
ety since the beginning of the all-volunteer force. Today, military ser-
vice makes a person distinctive rather than unremarkable, and, as a
result, we lose an exchange of knowledge between the two worlds that
contributes to understanding. 14 Particularly in academia, there is an
unfamiliarity with the military that handicaps our ability to make pro-
ductive suggestions about how best to improve the institution. I often
encounter, for example, unrealistic assumptions about the nature of
military service. Many people have a narrow picture of military duty
that features blind, fanatical obedience; an absence of rational, moral
decision-making; and an atmosphere of retaliation and coercion im-
posed by a system of rank.
The divide seems even larger with respect to women. Feminist
scholars have failed to examine in any specific sense the responsibili-
ties that women accept as part of the military institution. 15 "To the
degree that servicewomen are discussed by feminists, they are charac-
terized primarily as victims. 1 6 But this sole focus on women's victimi-
zation necessarily results in a restricted view of women's agency. This
view assumes that the only relevant forms of agency are those acts of
resistance women take in response to sexually oppressive behavior, ig-
noring entirely women's agency in relation to their military responsi-
bilities. The full scope of women's agency is far broader than just
women's interaction with men, and should also include women's
agency as part of the military institution they serve.
What follows is a description ofjust one example of women's mili-
tary responsibility, one of the thousands of everyday tasks that women
customarily perform. I rely on ajob specialty from the U.S. Air Force
because it is the service with which I have the most familiarity,' 7 and I
focus on nuclear-weapons duty because it offers a clear illustration of
agency and responsibility unrelated to sex.
Women actually made their first entrance into combat duty posi-
tions about twenty years ago when they were permitted to serve as U.S.
Air Force missile launch officers.'8 These officers-"missileers"-are
14 See Kirstin S. Dodge, Countenancing Corruption: A Civic Republican Case Against
Judicial Deference to the Militay, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 28 (1992).
15 See LEISA D. MEYER, CREATING GI JANE: SEXUALITY AND POWER IN THE WOMEN'S
ARMw CoRPs DURING WORLD WAR II 4 (1996) (noting "[f]leminist scholars' unwilling-
ness to address women's position within the military").
16 Id.
17 See supra note 12.
18 For background information on U.S. Air Force missile duty and the integration
of women as missile launch officers, see Richard Halloran, Male-Female Missile Crews
Pass Test, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1988, at B8; Richard Halloran, Some Missile Crews to Pair
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generally in their mid-twenties and have been responsible since the
early 1960s for the doomsday duty of launching nuclear ICBMs-in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles-from underground silos buried
across the central plains of the United States. Although missile crew
members never see the enemy in a traditional line-of-sight sense, the
Air Force treats missile launch duty as a combat assignment analogous
to flying in combat aircraft. In fact, under the cold-war assumptions
in place at the time women began to serve, missile crew members
would probably have been the first to come under fire in a nuclear
exchange.
Missile duty is a desolate assignment; for obvious reasons, missile
launch control facilities are geographically separated from one an-
other and from population centers. They are even geographically dis-
tant from the military bases to which the missileers are permanently
assigned. A single missile wing, or the unit to which responsibility for
all IGBMs at a single Air Force base is assigned, can have more than a
dozen separate launch facilities spread over thousands of square
miles. Maintenance personnel and launch crews may drive for hours
to reach work sites and, given the northern location of many missile
bases, winter snow over rural roads often complicates transportation
further.
It should not be surprising that missile crew duty is not a nine-to-
five job. Crew members descend to their work stations several stories
below ground and remain for twenty-four-hour shifts. They lock
themselves behind heavy blast doors inaccessible from "topside";
although crew members have electronic views of the outside, no one
on the outside can view them. Unexpected changes in weather or
crew availability could extend the around-the-clock shift.
Different generations of missiles in the nuclear arsenal have had
different types of facilities and different crew sizes, affecting the man-
ner in which women were gradually integrated to unlimited crew du-
ties. At first, in 1978, women were permitted to join only four-person
Titan missile crews (two officers and two enlisted persons),19 which
Men and Women, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1987, at Al; Brad Knickerbocker, Whither the Min-
uteman2, CHmSm SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 7, 1983, at 1; Howard Silber, Single-Sex Minute-
man Crews Ordered; Women Resent Silo Segregation, OMAHA WoRLD-HERALD,Jan. 19,1986,
available in 1986 WL 4075136; The Warren Missileers, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE,Jan. 1997, at
30; Bernard Weinraub, AirForce Plans to Assign Women to Titan Missile-Launching Crews,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1977, at 1; Women Are Cleared for Duty on Missile Launching Crews,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1985, at B5.
19 Judith Stiehm has written a short, very helpful primer containing many of the
facts necessary for a basic understanding of military personnel, recruitment, promo-
tion, and assignment policies. The article assumes no prior knowledge and would be
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served in three-story underground crew capsules. The earliest women
missileers were barred, however, from Minuteman missile sites, which
were run by two-person crews from a single-room underground
bunker containing the missile equipment, a cot, and a curtained-off
restroom area. Later, in 1986, crews composed of two women (but
not of one man and one woman) were added to Minuteman facilities
as the Titan missiles began to be phased out of the military's inven-
tory. By 1988, however, the Air Force finally grew weary of the sched-
uling problems created by sex-specific assignments and removed all
restrictions on the use of women missileers.
It is probably very fortunate that missile launch crews were inte-
grated to include women twenty years ago, because I have doubts that
it would happen today. The crisis-level of attention currently given to
issues of sexual misconduct in the military has created an atmosphere
making it less likely, ironically, that women's military responsibilities
would be expanded. Feminists have taken positions on behalf of ser-
vicewomen that sound very much like partial agency, which, in the
context of the military, may be counterproductive in the long-term.
If military women's agency is only partial, then what is it missing?
As discussed before, the theory of partial agency focuses entirely on
agency related to sexual oppression by men. In an earlier essay, The
Beginning of the End for Women in the Military,20 I have written in more
detail about the ways in which women's advocates have presumed that
servicewomen are agency-diminished in the realm of sexual conduct,
whether consensual or nonconsensual. In short, women are assumed
to have less-than-full capacity to decline a noncoercive offer to engage
in consensual sexual misconduct, 2' less-than-full capacity to confront
particularly helpful to those without any exposure to military society. SeeJudith Hicks
Stiehm, Just the Facts, Ma'am, in IT's OUR MiLITARY, Too!: WOMEN AND THE U.S. MILI-
TARY (Judith Hicks Stiehm ed., 1996). Her explanation of the difference between
enlisted persons and officers is representative:
Officers and enlisted are ranked separately, but all officers outrank all en-
listed. Enlisted and officers correspond roughly to those military personnel
with high school diplomas and those with college degrees, respectively....
Thus, young and inexperienced officers can find themselves giving orders to
much older, highly competent, and experienced enlisted personnel.
Id. at 60.
20 Diane H. Mazur, The Beginning of the End for Women in the Military, 48 FLA. L.
REv. 461 (1996).
21 Consensual sexual misconduct is almost a misnomer in the civilian world; nor-
mally conduct is not misconduct unless it is unwanted. The military is very different,
as completely consensual intimate relationships can be prohibited and punished by
military law. Fraternization, most often defined as a personal relationship (either pla-
tonic or intimate) between an officer and an enlisted person, is against military law.
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sexual harassment with an objection and demand to desist, and less-
than-full capacity to report inappropriate behavior they cannot con-
trol to higher authority.
In their efforts to solve the problem of military sexual miscon-
duct, women's advocates both outside and inside the military have
proposed measures designed to compensate for limitations in ser-
vicewomen's agency. For example, military women could be barred
from unmonitored one-on-one interaction with male colleagues or
superiors; military women could be excused from penalty for consen-
sual sexual misconduct with military men; and military women could
be afforded alternate ways of reporting misconduct outside usual mili-
tary channels.22
These descriptions of limited or partial agency are not at all new;
they have been raised before on behalf of civilian women in contend-
ing that the law of sexual harassment should reflect the perspective of
the reasonable (female) victim, not the offending (male) harasser.
23
What is new is the suggestion in this Article that descriptions of wo-
men as partial agents with respect to sexually oppressive behavior may
be so fundamentally inconsistent with the agency requirements of a
particular occupation that they effectively exclude women from
participation.
Returning to the issue of women missileers, one can imagine the
din that would be raised if the military was first suggesting integration
of missile launch crews today. The idea of locking a lone woman un-
derground with either one or three men for around-the-clock (or
longer) shifts, separated from any protective authority by miles of ru-
ral, snow-bound highway, without cameras to monitor misconduct,
would be an impossible sell under current circumstances.
Interestingly, limitations on women's agency were never an issue
when integrating women launch officers. 24 The concern at the time,
in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, was that both women and men
Personal relationships between two officers or between two enlisted persons can also
constitute fraternization if one of the two is responsible for supervising the other. See
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (1995) part IV, 83. See generally David
S. Jonas, Fraternization: Time for a Rational Department of Defense Standard, 135 Mnt. L.
REv. 37 (1992). Adultery can be a crime if "under the circumstances, the conduct of
the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or
was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces." MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (1995) part IV, 62.
22 See Mazur, supra note 20, at 465-70.
23 See infra Part II.B.
24 Women launch officers campaigned for the shift to mixed-sex Minuteman
crews because they wanted to train under more senior, experienced male officers. On
same-sex women's crews, relatively inexperienced officers were paired with one an-
1998]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[
might have a little more sexual agency than was appropriate-that wo-
men and men would capitalize on conditions of enforced privacy to
engage in consensual misconduct. The Air Force polled spouses of
male missileers for their opinions about women missileers and found
that the wives were "generally supportive" of the women, provided
they served only with each other and not with their husbands. If there
had been any concern for the safety of women missileers, the Air
Force would have been less likely to start the experiment with Titan
facilities, which left the word of one woman against three men. More
likely was the hope that consensual affairs were less likely to take place
in the absence of the one-to-one privacy available in Minuteman
facilities.
More importantly, lack of attention to the possibility of limita-
tions in women's agency was consistent with the reason for putting
women on nuclear missile duty in the first place: to train the most
qualified people available to prevent accidental, unauthorized, or mis-
taken use of nuclear weapons. Unlike the stereotypical view of mili-
tary discipline that many hold-unquestioned obedience achieved
through coercion and retaliation-safety in military technology, par-
ticularly nuclear weaponry, requires decentralized authority and deci-
sion-making. Even the lowest-ranking individual involved has the
authority to challenge and overrule superiors in the interests of
safety.
2 5
Reliance on thejudgment of lower-ranking servicemembers plays
a necessary role in the concept of "redundancy," one of the most im-
portant factors in nuclear safety. 2 6 Redundancy in either personnel or
technology can increase overall safety even if individual components
of the system are less than perfectly reliable. For example, if one crew
member would fail to notice an unsafe condition on one occasion out
of one hundred, the reliability of the operation could be increased by
the addition of another crew member with the same level of reliability.
Provided that one crew member's observations are not related to and
are not influenced or controlled by the observations of the other, the ex-
other. See Mixed-Sex Crews Signal Missile Policy Change, OMAHA WoRLD-HERAD, Jan. 25,
1988, available in 1988 WL 5256929.
25 See Scott D. SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF SAFETY- ORGANIZATIONS, ACCIDENTS, AND Nu-
CLEAR WEAPONs 22 (1993).
26 Three other critical factors in nuclear safety are 1) the priority that leadership
places on safety and reliability; 2) the development of a decentralized "culture of
reliability" at all levels of the organization; and 3) the capacity to learn through trial
and error. Id. at 17.
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pected level of error would drop to only one occasion in ten
thousand.
27
The Air Force's application of redundancy in the nuclear weap-
ons field is called the "two-man policy, '28 requiring that "a minimum
of two authorized persons, each capable of detecting incorrect or un-
authorized procedures with respect to the task to be performed and
familiar with pertinent safety and security requirements, will be pres-
ent."29 The policy applies not only to missileers, but to every Air Force
officer and enlisted person who repairs, stores, transports, or guards
nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-loaded aircraft. Servicemembers
can even be disciplined for unintentionally violating the boundaries
of a "no lone zone"30 during a routine job. The policy is taken ex-
tremely seriously,31 as it is "designed to ensure that no unstable indi-
viduai could ever gain control of a nuclear weapon."3 2
Of course, the two-man policy is useless unless both persons are
individually willing and able to respond decisively if an accident or
unauthorized act takes place. The responsibility remains the same
whether the circumstances are routine or extreme. Assume, for exam-
ple, a relatively minor incident33 in which a maintenance technician
27 Id. at 19-21.
28 The phrase "two-man policy" was coined when only men worked with nuclear
weapons, and to my knowledge it has not been changed since women have entered
the field. It has about as much influence on the status of military women as the
phrase "man-to-man defense" has on the status of women who play basketball. Wo-
men use both phrases without concern. See, e.g., Frank Litsky, An Aggressive Old Do-
minion Pounds Stanford Out of the Final N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1997, at 27 (quoting
Stanford basketball star Jamila Wideman, after the 1997 national semi-final game
against Old Dominion University, on the reasons for Stanford's loss: "They play a
more aggressive man-to-man defense than any team we played this season.").
29 SAGAN, supra note 25, at 83 n.87. See also ASHTON B. CARTER ET AL., MANAGING
NucL..AR OPERATIONS 50 (1987) ("Two-man rule requires every sensitive action taken
with nuclear weapons to be accomplished by two people with the same training and
authority.").
30 "No lone zones" are those areas in which the "two man policy" applies and no
individual can enter alone. CARTER ET AL., supra note 29, at 50.
31 In United States v. Cansdale, 1 MJ. 894 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976), a security policeman
stole tools from a tool box stored near a nuclear-weapons-loaded B-52 aircraft. He
was not only charged with larceny, but also with dereliction of duty for entering a "no
lone zone" by himself to steal the tools. "No lone zones" are designated around air-
craft by thick red stripes painted on the flightline or by red rope strung on standards
set up around the aircraft. See id. at 895.
32 SAGAN, supra note 25, at 250.
33 Cf BROKEN ARROW (Twentieth Century Fox 1995). For those who have seen
the film "Broken Arrow," starringJohn Travolta, the title phrase is borrowed from the
military's system for reporting nuclear incidents or accidents. Events are categorized
based on severity, ranging from catastrophic to minor, with the categories named by
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bumps a weapon storage cart into a wall, causing a dent in the
weapon. The incident has to be documented and reported, even if
the person responsible for the accident is higher ranking, and even if
that higher-ranking individual threatens to blame the accident on a
subordinate or to ruin her career if she makes a report. Without full
and unlimited agency with respect to nuclear-safety responsibilities on
the part of both team members, nuclear safety is diminished.
The same full and unlimited agency is demanded under the ulti-
mate circumstances for missile launch crews. To prevent an acciden-
tal, unauthorized, or mistaken launch of a nuclear weapon, each
missileer must independently agree to act jointly in initiating the
launch. The following is a description of Minuteman launch
procedures:
Each [crew member] has the combination to a double-padlocked
safe containing the sealed authentication codes and two launch
keys. Each of the two officers would separately decode and com-
pare the codes in the launch order with those in the safe. If the
codes match, the officers would then identify another digital group
in the launch order just received; this group of eight digits is
plugged into the PAL [Permissive Action Link-an electronic lock
for the missiles] system and, in effect, arms the missiles. The next
step would require the officers to turn dual keys that are located too
far apart for either to turn by himself.
3 4
Once a launch procedure begins, the only thing that will prevent
an accidental, unauthorized, or mistaken use of nuclear weapons is
the independentjudgment and agency of an individual crew member.
variants on the "arrow" theme. "Broken Arrow" accidents, like the theft of nuclear
weapons portrayed in the film, would be the most serious; "Bent Spear" incidents
would be of intermediate severity; and "Dull Sword" would be the designation for
incidents involving minor damage to nuclear weapons. See CARTER ET AL., supra note
29, app. D, tbl. 2D-1 at 62-63 (summarizing U.S. Army and European reporting
requirements).
34 JOHN NEwHousE, WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 281 (1989) (companion
book to the Public Broadcasting System documentary television series With the same
title). See also CARTER ET AL., supra note 29, at 167-68 (describing the Permissive
Action Link control feature).
The Air Force has recently upgraded the original Minuteman command and con-
trol equipment housed in the launch facility. The two crew members are no longer
physically separated and now sit side by side. But the "two man policy" aspect of the
procedure is still retained; the launch now requires a "four-hand key-turn." With four
hands necessary to launch, a single officer still cannot act alone. SeeWilliam M. Arkin,
The Six-Hundred Million Dollar Mouse; Air Force Space Command's REACT Command Sys-
tem, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTIsTs, Nov. 21, 1996, at 68.
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There is no. provision for any partial agency on the part of a woman
missileer whose partner is a man.
35
II. WOMEN'S AGENCY AND SEXUAL MIscoNDucr
How close is the comparison between women's agency with re-
spect to military responsibility and women's agency with respect to
sexual misconduct? The two should not be that far apart. "The attrib-
utes associated with agency are necessary not only to such intimate
pursuits as sexuality, but also to the range of public activities that con-
stitute commercial exchange or citizenship. ' 36 Then why do we view
women's agency with respect to sexual interaction so differently? We
assume that women have complete capacity to consent in contract,
absent extraordinary disparity in power, but question whether women
exercise full agency in matters of sexual consent.37 We recognize that
women's equal responsibility for the burdens of military service is a
prerequisite for equal citizenship,38 but question whether women ex-
ercise full agency in response to breaches of military law.
Women's agency in response to sexually oppressive behavior is an
extremely sensitive issue. To many feminists, agency leads to an as-
signment of responsibility, and responsibility then leads to an assign-
ment of blame. As a result, if women are characterized as having
anything more than partial agency, they are left open to charges that
they are somehow at fault for men's conduct. Agency, however, need
not lead inevitably to blame. Servicemembers with nuclear duties, for
example, are asked to take responsibility for the misconduct of others
and respond in a way that will ultimately improve safety. Taking this
responsibility for reducing risk to themselves and others, however,
35 Consider what the military's response should have been if First Lieutenant Wil-
liam L. Calley, Jr., convicted of murder in the My Lai incident in Vietnam, had been a
woman. See United States v. Calley, 22 C.M-. 534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973). In compari-
son to the Vietnam War era, military women are now more often in a position to
commit war crimes. If they are ordered by male superiors to commit war crimes, will
we excuse them on the basis of their limited agency with respect to men?
Servicemembers have an obligation to disobey illegal orders from superiors de-
spite the power and authority conferred by higher rank. "They must learn to follow
orders yet retain sufficient autonomy to refuse illegal orders.... ." JAMES H. TONER, TRUE
FArrH AND ALLEGLANCE: THE BURDEN OF MILITARY ETmIcs 46 (1995). "No one can
escape the dilemmas, whether he be a four-star general or a rifleman, a man or a
woman." James Glover, A Soldier and His Conscience, in THE PARAMETERS OF MnxARY
ETHics 143, 143 (LloydJ. Matthews & Dale E. Brown eds., 1989).
36 Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 351.
37 SeeYoung, supra note 1, at 295-96.
38 See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499, 523-45 (1991).
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does not mean that they are at fault in any way for the original
misconduct.
There may be something in this view of responsibility that holds
promise for women trying to counter sexually oppressive behavior.
Martha Chamallas has described the "reasonable" woman as one who
is "dedicated to eliminating or alleviating the effects of stereotyping 39
and "consciously interested in improving [her] status in the work-
place,"40 but not "the average woman who has found a way to cope
with, but not to challenge, sexually harassing conduct."41 I believe Pro-
fessor Chamallas' intention was to describe what changes in the atmos-
phere of a workplace are reasonable for women to insist upon, but her
words could also be read in a way that could potentially have even
greater benefits for women. She could have been describing the role
that women themselves could reasonably be expected to play in the
process of achieving equality in the workplace.
I do not mean to suggest that an emphasis on women's partial
agency is never appropriate or that women are never limited by op-
pressive circumstances in the choices they have available to them. A
more specific analysis of women's agency in response to sexual op-
pression, however, might identify those circumstances in which it is
both reasonable and necessary for the law to expect women to exer-
cise greater agency.
A. Avoiding the Extremes of Agency Theory
Most propositions tend to swing wildly between extremes. The
agency attributed to military women today-at least agency in sexual
interaction with military men-is at its lowest possible ebb. More than
fifty years ago, however, the equation of victimization and agency for
military women was very different. During World War II, women were
held largely responsible for inappropriate consensual relationships
with military men. Even when the woman was the lower-ranking par-
ticipant, she usually received disproportionately greater punish-
ment.42 "[I] t was the servicewomen's responsibility to say 'no' to these
encounters.
'43
39 Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sex-
ual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 116 (1992).
40 Id. at 135.
41 Id. (emphasis added).
42 See MEYER, supra note 15, at 138-39. For example, female officers who were
nurses were punished for fraternization with enlisted male medical orderlies, and fe-
male enlisted soldiers were punished for fraternization with male officers. The only
common denominator was that men were not responsible. See id. at 132-34.
43 Id. at 139.
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This assignment of responsibility to women reflected more than
just a "boys will be boys" sentiment. It was part of a characterization of
military women that was packed full of agency. 'Worries that ser-
vicewomen might become sexual victims were joined by depictions of
Wacs [members of the Women's Army Corps] as sexual actors and
agents engaging in the same types of promiscuity, drunkenness, and
sexual adventure tacitly encouraged in male GIs."44 Much the same
thing happened during the Persian Gulf War. Consensual sexual mis-
conduct within the military was represented as a failure in women's
responsibility, as though the misconduct was something women could
engage in by themselves. 45
It seems that all we have accomplished is to move from a system
in which only women were punished for inappropriate sexual choices
to one in which only men are punished, from one in which men had
none of the responsibility to one in which men have all of it.46
Neither extreme is helpful to women. "When we opt for either/or
thinking, we actually opt out of thinking."47 In her article Surviving
Victim Talk, Martha Minow cautions against a view of victimization that
silences any particularized discussion of responsibility. "Treating all
participants as more than mere victims and more than mere perpetra-
tors, recognizing the capacity of the most victimized for choice, re-
dressing the structures of constraint, and treating responsibility not as
blame but as the ability to respond-these elements seem to make a
difference."
48
Treating responsibility not as blame but as the ability to respond-that is
the key to characterizing the law of sexual harassment in a way that is
44 Id. at 34.
45 See id. at 183 ("These rumors placed the responsibility and blame for sexual
activity on women and made no mention of their male sexual partners.").
46 The infamous case of First Lieutenant Kelly Flinn is distinguishable. She was
discharged from the U.S. Air Force for conduct primarily related to an inappropriate
consensual relationship with a civilian man, not a military man. We seem to grant a
greater degree of agency to military women in their sexual interaction with civilian
men; there is no excuse for failing to conform one's conduct to the law. However, Lt.
Flinn's lawyer still did his best to portray his client, a B-52 bomber pilot, as incapaci-
tated by the influence of manly charm. See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, Wings of Desire, TIME,
June 2, 1997, at 28; Gregory L. Vistica & Evan Thomas, Sex and Lies, NEwswEEV, June
2, 1997, at 26.
More generally, Lt. Flinn's case suffered from a number of misrepresentations
and confusions created by both defense counsel and the military; the media were
almost never knowledgeable enough to identify them. See generally Diane H. Mazur,
The Top Ten Things People Don't Understand About Kelly Flinn (1997) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the author).
47 Minow, supra note 1, at 1443.
48 Id. at 1444.
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constructive for women. But the temptation toward the categorical
position seems irresistible, arising from an enormous reluctance to
evaluate women's behavior at all. Suggesting that women have
choices in how they respond to sexual harassment will inevitably lead
to judgments of "bad" choices as well as "good" choices. Scholarship
on sexual harassment, therefore, tends to minimize agency in an at-
tempt to shield women's behavior from the risk of unfair review.
Entire categories of potential acts of agency in response to sexual
oppression have been eliminated. As a result, we no longer make dis-
tinctions in capacity for agency under different circumstances-it is
easier to start with the assumption that agency is restricted across the
board. For example, in the context of noncoercive, consensual mis-
conduct, women could potentially take responsibility to decline to
participate. In the context of sexual harassment, women could poten-
tially take responsibility to confront and object to the behavior, or to
report to higher authority the misconduct they are unable to control.
Once again, I am not suggesting that women are responsible for, or
are at fault for, men's behavior-but they could potentially take re-
sponsibility for their own behavior in responding to misconduct in a
constructive way. Whether the law of sexual harassment should en-
courage such constructive responses is a question that has not yet
been answered.
Most writers in the field, however, prevent the question from be-
ing asked at all. With consensual misconduct, it is easier to eliminate
the issue by simply declaring that "there is no such thing" as a consen-
sual relationship under circumstances of inequality. 49 With sexual
harassment, a woman acts reasonably even though she does not chal-
lenge, object to, or complain about misconduct, because it is possible
she could lose her job if she refuses to be a compliant victim.5 0 Both
49 See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 831 (1991) ("The more
radical response to this argument is that there is no such thing as truly 'welcome' sex
between a male boss and a female employee who needs herjob."); Young, supra note
1, at 280 (criticizing blanket assumption that "no matter what the student may believe,
no affiliation between a professor and a student is ever truly consensual").
50 See Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 365 ("These are the ways in which
women under oppressive conditions seek to secure themselves from offensive conduct
while preserving their employment opportunities and livelihood."); Martha Chamal-
las, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 801
(1988) ("In both the rape and sexual harassment contexts, resistance on the part of
the victim was apt to be risky. The noncompliant employee risked losing her job
..... ); Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual Harass-
ment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REv. 499, 527 ("This burden [of confrontation or complaint]
... harshly ignores the real fears of many targets that either action could result in
retaliation or discharge .... ).
[VOL. 74:1
WOMEN, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE MILITARY
of these assumptions, although they carry some degree of truth, are
"conversation stoppers." They leave no room for rational analysis of
factual circumstances and no room for discussion of whether different
assumptions might lead to a more effective remedy. Although, for ex-
ample, there may be a possibility a woman could be fired for con-
fronting harassment, there is almost a certainty the harassment will
not end until she does confront it.
Even when sexual harassment scholars concede that women have
some capacity for choice in responding to oppression, their options
are characterized in stark extremes. Once an option for the exercise
of agency is established as an unrealistic "straw man," it becomes eas-
ier to dismiss the possibility as unreasonable and unhelpful. For ex-
ample, if the primary agency attributed to a victim of sexual
harassment is her freedom to quit and go elsewhere, 51 it seems unrea-
sonable to expect her to exercise any agency at all because the conse-
quences are so severe.
Overstatement or misrepresentation, even in the service of higher
goals, is usually counterproductive. Lawyers can be some of the worst
offenders; their zeal in representation can sacrifice long-term good
for many in the process of achieving short-term good for one:
Injustifying legal intervention or a mitigation of legal sanction, law-
yers have described, and judges have acknowledged, a female sub-
ject wholly incapable of self-direction, whom the law must rescue
from her plight or relieve of responsibility for her actions. The
pragmatic interest of feminist lawyers in securing positive outcomes
for their clients has often made them complicit in this dichotomiz-
ing tendency.52
Descriptions of women as victims, stripped of capacity for in-
dependent agency, are "off-putting,"53 to say the least, to some wo-
men. More importantly, descriptions that misrepresent the factual
complexity of women's capacity for choice can harm women more
51 See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 1294 (explaining why "exit" is an unattractive
choice for victims of sexual harassment). Professor Mahoney objects, as I do, to
"[elquating exit and agency," id. at 1285, but I believe she downplays the utility of
more direct, confrontational forms of agency. She first notes a number of potential
acts of agency in response to sexual harassment-"telling the perpetrator to 'knock it
off,' filing complaints through company mechanisms, bringing lawsuits, or taking
political action-but then dismisses these options as unrealistic because they could
result in stigma, bring emotional pain, or be ignored. Id. at 1290.
52 Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 351-52.
53 Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, supra note 1, at 762.
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than it can help them in the long run.54 Then why go down that
road? Strangely enough, it is the concededly inaccurate, "over the
top" nature of the characterizations that is rewarded with a measure of
praise in some quarters. The more that pictures of women as agency-
diminished are "amplified"55 (a euphemism, I believe, for "exagger-
ated"), the more they seem to persuade skeptical audiences.
56
I always warn my students they should be wary of advancing argu-
ments in which they will "meet themselves coming back around the
other way." Less awkwardly phrased, overstatement for the benefit of
one strategic purpose almost inevitably leads to vulnerability on an-
other issue-and the end result is usually negative.57 This warning
has held true with the treatment of agency in the context of sexual
harassment law.
B. Women's Agency and the Definition of "Welcomeness" in Sexual
Harassment Law
The concept of women's agency finds its closest counterpart in
sexual harassment law in the element of "welcomeness." Inappropri-
ate sexual behavior in the workplace-conduct that creates a "hostile
environment"-is actionable only if the behavior is unwelcomed by
the plaintiff.58 Agency and welcomeness are analogs to the extent that
they both focus on the conduct of women; inappropriate sexual be-
havior is unwelcome when a woman demonstrates that it is unwel-
come, normally "by her conduct.
'59
The concepts of agency and welcomeness are also linked in the
critiques they receive. Feminists have argued that it is inappropriate
to examine women's behavior-whether for expressions of welcome-
ness or of agency-in a context in which men's behavior ought to be
the focus. " [W] elcomeness serves as a means to keep the focus on the
woman rather than the supervisor; on what she, rather than he, has
done wrong; and on whether she deserves to be treated with human
54 See id. at 776 (recognizing that limited-agency arguments could support posi-
tion "that women lack the capacities for self-determination necessary to give them
autonomous control over all spheres of their existence").
55 Id. at 774.
56 See id. at 770-72, 774-76.
57 In an earlier article I explain why characterizations of gay military plaintiffs in
both scholarship and litigation have been misrepresentative, and why those strategi-
cally-motivated mischaracterizations will be harmful in the long term. See Diane H.
Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critique of "Gays in the Military" Scholarship and Litigation,
29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 223 (1996).
58 See generally Radford, supra note 50, at 503-05.
59 Merntor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
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decency, rather than whether he violated the standards of decency and
humanity."60 It has "the potential to transform a claim of sexualized
injury into a 'trial of the victim."'61
The strongest scholarly objection to the element of welcomeness
would eliminate it entirely:
It is gratuitously punitive if the environment is found objectively
hostile, for in that case the employer can nonetheless escape the
burden of addressing the issue, by portraying this particular woman
as so base as to be unworthy of respect or decency, and by arguing
that she thus welcomed, through her conduct, an environment
which a "reasonable" women would have perceived as hostile.62
Other writers advocate shifting the burden of proving welcome-
ness to defendants, which would in the typical case require men to
affirmatively prove that their sexual behavior was welcomed by women
rather than require women to prove that it was not.63 Even in these
60 Estrich, supra note 49, at 833.
61 Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 362 n.225.
62 Estrich, supra note 49, at 833.
63 See Radford, supra note 50, at 525-30. Welcomeness seems more in the nature
of an affirmative defense, more properly provable by the defendant. The defense of
welcomeness essentially concedes that the defendant inappropriately introduced be-
havior of a sexual nature into the workplace, but alleges that the plaintiff also contrib-
uted to that unprofessional workplace atmosphere by her own behavior. In that sense
welcomeness is analogous to the equitable affirmative defense of "unclean hands."
See Chamallas, supra note 50, at 809 (describing the defense of welcomeness as the
"'clean hands' approach").
"Welcome" sexual behavior has been viewed by some courts as "an inevitable as-
pect of a gender-integrated work environment," Radford, supra note 50, at 504, or as
"ostensibly harmless sexual interplay thought to exist in most workplaces," Abrams,
Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 362. It is not surprising that feminists are outraged
when clearly rank, offensive sexual conduct is deemed welcome under this definition,
because it suggests that rank, offensive sexual conduct is "inevitable" or "harmless."
The actual scope of welcomeness is something wider, also incorporating the "unclean
hands" principle. Even if a defendant's inappropriate sexual conduct was, considered
alone, unwelcome, the plaintiff will not be afforded a remedy for that conduct if she
also has brought inappropriate sexual behavior into the workplace.
It is misleading, in either case, to characterize welcomeness as a "presumption that
most workers welcome sexual conduct." See Radford, supra note 50, at 526 (emphasis
added). Placing the burden of proof on sexual harassment plaintiffs to prove un-
welcomeness does not presume conduct was welcome any more than placing the bur-
den of proof on negligence plaintiffs presumes that injury occurs without negligence.
Burdens of proof are not presumptions; rather, evidentiary presumptions oper-
ate to help parties meet burdens of proof. "The term 'presumption' describes a de-
vice that sometimes requires the trier to draw a particular conclusion on the basis of
certain facts." CHRISTOPIHER B. MUE..LER & LAIRD C. KIRRPATRICK, EVIDENCE 134
(1995). For example, the beneficiary in an insurance suit may benefit from a pre-
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more moderate criticisms of welcomeness, however, one finds the un-
derlying assumption that the concept is superfluous because women
could have only one possible response to sexual interaction in the
workplace. How could women possibly welcome conduct that is "hu-
miliating, severely distracting, and potentially harmful to their ability
to perform successfully at their jobs"?
64
This viewpoint, though, assumes the conclusion. Of course, wo-
men do not welcome conduct they find humiliating; whether they
might welcome conduct they do not find humiliating is another ques-
tion. Interestingly, critiques of women's agency and critiques of the
welcomeness requirement echo one another in that both characterize
women as diminished or limited in their capacity for responsible
choice. If we assume that women are limited in their capacity to re-
spond constructively to sexual oppression, then we never have to con-
sider what a constructive response might be and whether the law
should encourage it. If we assume that women are incapable of con-
tributing to an unprofessional atmosphere of sexual interaction in the
workplace, then we never have to consider whether their behavior is
ever counterproductive for the advancement of women and whether
the law should discourage it.
Once again, it all comes back to how one views the concept of
responsibility. Critics of the current state of sexual harassment law
believe that judicial scrutiny of welcomeness implies that women are
ultimately responsible for men's misconduct. "[I] n making the deter-
mination of the harassment ofwomen dependent upon the extent of
'sexually provocative' behavior by women, the Court adopts a rule
which holds women responsible for their own torment. '65 But this
criticism is overstated. Women are responsible for their own conduct,
sumption of accidental death that arises once the beneficiary offers evidence of the
insured's sudden, violent death. The presumption allows the beneficiary to meet his
or her burden of proof on the issue of accidental death without actually offering
evidence that bears directly on cause of death. Because a presumption only assists in
meeting a burden of proof, it would not make sense to describe a party without the
burden of proof on an issue as benefiting from a presumption. Id. at 139. Defend-
ants in sexual harassment cases do not carry the burden of proving welcomeness;
therefore, no presumption of welcomeness exists.
64 Radford, supra note 50, at 526. See also id. at 505 (contending that the element
of welcomeness "perpetuates the myth that most people are not offended by attention
of a sexual nature in the workplace"). In a footnote, Professor Radford also acknowl-
edged that it could be counterproductive to eliminate the element of welcomeness
altogether, as it "might imply the extremist notion that women never welcome sexual
attention or interaction at work and thus must be protected from all advances made
by their colleagues." Id. at 541 n.250.
65 Estrich, supra note 49, at 829.
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not men's conduct.66 If sexual harassment law denies some women a
remedy, it does not do so because these women are base, undeserving
of human decency, or unworthy of respect. 67 It does not do so be-
cause some women deserve in any way to be harassed. Properly ap-
plied, it should deny a remedy only if women's conduct is
counterproductive to the goal of improving the status of women in
the workplace.
One of the reasons the current crisis of sexual misconduct in the
military has been so intractable is because incidents of sexual harass-
ment and assault have taken place against a startling backdrop of un-
disciplined consensual misconduct by both military men and military
women. Although the result is often unfair to unconsenting victims,
the reality is that it is enormously difficult to select out a smaller
number of instances of nonconsensual misconduct from a much
larger number of instances of consensual misconduct.
The Army's investigation into sexual assaults committed at its Ab-
erdeen Proving Ground training installation provides an illustration.
The military's current scandal of sexual misconduct began there, with
drill sergeants accused of a series of sexual offenses against women in
Army technical-training programs.6 8 In the process of investigating
66 Self-defense, claims on the part of women who kill their abusive partners raise
similar definitional issues of responsibility. For example, Elizabeth Schneider criti-
ques the state of self-defense law for women in the following way: "Many commenta-
tors have noted the troubling result of the focus on why the woman does not leave.
Asking this question places responsibility on the woman, and puts her conduct under
scrutiny, rather than placing the responsibility on the battering man." Schneider,
Particularity and Generality, supra note 1, at 558. See also Mahoney, supra note 1, at
1300 (arguing that question "why didn't she leave?" "directs attention away from the
batterer's quest for power and control, shifting inquiry to the legitimacy of response in
the person who was harmed") (emphasis added).
This criticism, however, raises two completely different issues of responsibility,
one for men and one for women, which are not directly comparable. The battering
male has already failed in his responsibility not to commit violence upon his partner.
The battered female, in contrast, has the responsibility to respond to violence in a
lawful manner. Legal scrutiny of non-violent options available to her does not relieve
her male partner of responsibility for his conduct; scrutiny of her options does not
make her responsible for his violence. The battered female, however, is still responsi-
ble for her own choices in response to violence. Expert testimony is critical for the
fact-finder's understanding of whether those choices were realistic.
67 See Estrich, supra note 49, at 833.
68 See Elaine Sciolino, Sergeant Convicted of 18 Counts of RapingFemale Subordinates:
Verdict Sends Signal Throughout Armed Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1997, at Al. There is a
common misunderstanding that because the defendant sergeants in the Aberdeen
cases were described as "drill sergeants," these assaults were committed against the
Army's newest recruits during basic training. Aberdeen Proving Ground is a techni-
cal-training installation, devoted to teaching the specific skills required for different
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the charges, the Army discovered a level of consensual misconduct
that was completely out of control. "[A] parade of former trainees, all
women, . . . testified that drill sergeants and trainees alike routinely
initiated consensual sexual relations-a violation of military law
"69
One after the other, the female witnesses also described a free-
wheeling, libidinous atmosphere in Which sexual activity between
superiors and subordinates and adultery were rampant, drill ser-
geants competed to have sex with as many female trainees as they
could and trainees found endless ways around the rules.
Soldiers had sexual intercourse in a public game-and-television
room and in the backs of buses, and it was common to find empty
liquor bottles and used condoms in the trainees' barracks and stor-
age rooms in the mornings .... 70
The problem that consensual sexual misconduct introduces in
controlling nonconsensual behavior is not limited to situations in
which military men outrank military women. During the Tailhook
free-for-all of 1991, some female officers contributed, along with their
male colleagues, to an atmosphere that fostered sexual assault.
71
military career specialties. Soldiers are not assigned to these training schools until
after they have successfully completed basic training. See id. Technical-training
schools serve as a bridge to regular military life; the unrelenting degree of supervision
and discipline characteristic of basic training is reduced to encourage independent
responsibility and self-sufficiency. By this time servicemembers have also received an
initial program of orientation about how the military should work, and they presuma-
bly have been educated about appropriate and inappropriate forms of sexual
conduct.
69 Elaine Sciolino, Rape Witnesses Tell of Base Out of Control, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15,
1997, at A8. In the civilian context, Martha Chamallas has raised the question
whether lower-status individuals (students or employees, for example) should also be
sanctioned for engaging in inappropriate but consensual relationships with superiors.
See Chamallas, supra note 50, at 847, 860. She recognized that excusing the lower-
status individual from responsible behavior will, in practice, leave the impression that
"women must be protected against sex, even against their own wishes." Id. at 860. In
the end, Professor Chamallas concluded that reinforcement of women's diminished
agency is the lesser evil. "[T] he alternative-punishing both parties to the relation-
ship-is even less appealing." Id. But cf Young, supra note 1, at 294 ("Unfortunately,
once sexual harassment policies were in place, some of the policy creators expanded
the 'victim' class to include students engaged in consensual relationships with
professors.").
70 Sciolino, supra note 68, at A12.
71 See JEAN ZIMMERMAN, TAILSPIN: WOMEN AT WAR IN THE WAKE OF TAILHOOK 4
(1995) (noting the participation of female Naval officers in public "leg-shaving" at the
Tailhook convention); see also GREGORY L. VISrIcA, FALL FROM GLORY- THE MEN WHO
SANK THE U.S. NAW (1995) (reporting that one female Naval officer-a lawyer-
served drinks while topless at an earlier Tailhook convention). Gregory Vistica was
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I am not suggesting in any way that the Aberdeen and Tailhook
men who sexually assaulted or harassed women, or who otherwise en-
gaged in inappropriate sexual behavior while representing the mili-
tary, should not have been held accountable. I am suggesting that we
must consider whether it is constructive to assume, with respect to the
element of welcomeness, that women are incapable of contributing to
a sexualized environment. We must similarly consider whether it is
constructive to assume, with respect to sexual harassment, that women
are incapable of responding to inappropriate conduct in a responsible
manner. It is possible that an expectation of diminished capacity ulti-
mately works more to the detriment than to the benefit of all women.
C. The Tentativeness and Timidity of Partial Agency
The scholarship of Kathryn Abrams has been the most coura-
geous, by far, in attributing to women the capacity for responsibility in
the context of sexual oppression. She has resisted categorical repre-
sentations of women as diminished in agency, explaining that "it is
strategically advantageous for feminist scholars, in communicating
with even vaguely receptive audiences, to avoid presenting women's
powers of self-determination as largely or completely compromised
where they are only partially compromised."
72
Professor Abrams' work discourages reliance on the "polar im-
agery" commonly associated with women's claims for relief.73 These
overstated characterizations can be used in an effort to protect women
not only from oppression but also from the consequences of factual
complexity, choice, and responsibility. Exaggerated descriptions of
women's diminished capacity for agency paint "an imbalanced por-
trait of women's lives that discourages them from noticing or availing
themselves of a resource that is crucial to their resistance." 74 That
resource, in my view, is women's capacity for constructive response.
The theory of partial agency confronts strategic assumptions with
facts and specificity. It searches out specific "incidents of self-direc-
the reporter who first publicized the Tailhook incident in 1991. See id. at 332-35.
Vistica noted that much of the Tailhook reporting was factually selective. "It was an
easy story for the press to trumpet drunken military men sexually assaulting innocent
female victims. The networks, CNN, and the major newspaper dailies easily latched
on to that theme and avoided the more complex issues of women as aggressors and
men as victims." Id. at 347.
72 Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, supra note 1, at 779 n.54.
73 Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 361. See also id. at 375 ("[A]ctual
human lives are not confined to the dichotomous poles that they characteristically
occupy in law.").
74 Id. at 343 n.153.
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tion"75-acts of agency-"highlighting the ways in which many op-
pressed women express resistance."76 In identifying particular acts of
agency that women choose under oppressive circumstances, the ap-
proach of partial agency concedes, even celebrates, that some capacity
for choice exists. Women are characterized as "neither wholly empow-
ered, nor wholly incapacitated, in those contexts where they are
targets of sexualized conduct. '77 Partial agency therefore runs
counter to the impulse of pure dominance theorists to conceal facts
demonstrating that agency exists and therefore avoid judgment on
whether it was exercised reasonably.78
Partial agency's emphasis on factual context rather than general-
ity can only be a positive for women. It opens discussion of what-
exactly what-is reasonable to expect from women functioning under
oppressive circumstances. It also forces an examination of the rela-
tionship between reasonableness and constructiveness, which is an-
other way of describing responsibility. Even if a legal standard
accurately measures what is reasonable, or prevalent, or expected in
the behavior of women, we should then ask whether what is reason-
able is also constructive. "Reasonable" conduct that is counterproduc-
tive to the goal of improving the status of women may not be
responsible conduct if we treat responsibility not as blame but as the
ability to respond.
With sexual harassment, the fundamental agency question is
whether it is reasonable to expect women to express unwelcomeness
directly by either objecting to offensive conduct or by reporting con-
duct they cannot control to higher authority. The issue directly af-
fects the outcome of sexual harassment litigation, as courts may
require, or at least consider, evidence of verbal confrontation in de-
ciding whether workplace conduct was welcome. 79
Even Professor Abrams seems ambivalent about whether we
should expect women to register an objection to inappropriate work-
place conduct. On the one hand, she wants to believe that women do
have the capacity to object. "When feminist theorists say that we
should permit women recourse to law without requiring them to ad-
dress offenders on their own, they are not necessarily saying that wo-
75 Id. at 344.
76 Id. at 361.
77 Id. at 362.
78 See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1, 66 (1994) (reviewing
cases involving battered-woman defense to homicide and concluding that facts are
often selectively reported and "tailored to exploit the same assumptions that earned
women leniency under the marital coercion excuse").
79 See Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 364-65.
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men are intrinsically unable to resist acquaintance rape or speak
straightforwardly to sexual harassers." 80 She notes that university
training programs on sexual harassment suggest that "many women
will be able to communicate their disapproval of harassing behavior
with energy and resolve." 8'
On the other hand, there is a concern of unfairness; given the
way women are socialized, some women would not feel comfortable
objecting to sexual harassment in a direct manner.8 2 On balance, Pro-
fessor Abrams concludes that women are better served by discarding
any legal expectation of direct objection; the better result is to recog-
nize the ways in which women customarily respond to sexual harass-
ment as legally sufficient to show unwelcomeness. "[F] eminists
should make visible the subtle, unnoticed instances of resistance that
characterize women's lives and prevent the imposition of legal rules
that either obscure or undermine such resistance.1
83
[W] omen make many efforts to resist and extricate themselves from
harassing environments, few of which involve direct objection. Wo-
men confronted with workplace harassment most commonly try to
short-circuit or extricate themselves from the behavior through joc-
ularity, changes in subject, or efforts to avoid the perpetrator. That
such efforts are not always successful in curtailing the harassing con-
duct . . . should not . . . make them irrelevant to the issue of
unwelcomeness.
84
Women's reasonableness, therefore, is equated with commonal-
ity. If most women do not respond to inappropriate workplace behav-
ior by confronting their harassers and telling them to stop, or by
reporting the behavior to higher authority,85 and if most women do
respond to sexual harassment with avoidance or passive toleration,
8 6
then this prevailing response constitutes the "reasonable woman's"
perspective on the issue of welcomeness. 87 The scope of reasonable-
ness is limited only by the range of frequently observed behavior. One
writer's list of women's behaviors still considered to be reasonably
consistent with unwelcomeness extends much further.
[T] he following actions (or, for some, "non-actions") would not be
affirmative evidence of solicitation or consent: silence; a polite "no;"
80 Abrams, Songs of Innocence, supra note 1, at 1552.
81 Id. at 1544.
82 See id. at 1547-48.
83 Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 361.
84 Id. at 365.
85 See Radford, supra note 50, at 527.
86 See id. at 524.
87 See Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 365 n.243.
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evasive behavior; laughing, smiling, or otherwise attempting to
make light of the advance; backing away or withdrawing one's
hands but not physically leaving the harasser's presence; maintain-
ing eye contact; changing the subject; accepting a kiss on the cheek
or a quick hug; the failure to complain.
88
This is the point at which partial agency in the sexual harassment
context becomes too timid and tentative. Has women's agency-wo-
men's capacity to respond-been limited to a degree that precludes
progress? Does the law of sexual harassment work uphill if it validates
passive, subservient, and obsequious behavior that may only reinforce
workplace inequality?8 9 If women's instances of resistance are "subtle"
and "unnoticed,"90 then they accomplish nothing in changing the sta-
tus of women in the workplace. Recognition of subtle and unnoticed
instances of resistance by courts will benefit only that microscopic per-
centage of women whose claims are litigated. If resistance cannot be
heard in the workplace, it will have no meaningful effect.
Even the potential benefit of counteracting stark, agency-dimin-
ished images of women fails. Professor Abrams suggests that emphasis
on women's indirect acts of agency "might also help to mitigate the
cultural assumption that sexual harassment victims who do not di-
rectly confront their harassers do nothing to halt, interrupt, or indi-
cate their displeasure with the offensive conduct."91 These indirect
acts of agency may show that women "do something," but unless wo-
men who face sexual harassment "do something worthwhile," nothing
will change.
There is such a reluctance to leave anyone behind; if any woman
might be incapable of responding in a constructive manner, then the
law should expect no woman to respond in a constructive manner.
Even the most timid form of partial agency is considered a risk be-
cause some women may not be able to summon that level of con-
strained resistance.9 2 Each time the law reduces its expectation for
constructive response, however, we lose an opportunity to rectify
inequality.
88 Radford, supra note 50, at 532.
89 See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581, 613 (1990) (recognizing that feminism's embrace of women's shared victim-
ization plays into men's sexist ideology).
90 See Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 361.
91 Id. at 366.
92 See id. at 366, see also Abrams, Social Construction, supra note 10, at 1039 (pro-
posing evaluation of workplace conduct from the perspective of the "most vulnerable
woman" rather than the "reasonable woman").
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Partial agency comes very close to providing a productive frame-
work for crediting women's conduct under restrictive circumstances.
The theory recognizes that fact-specific accounts of women's capacity
to respond can create socially constructive images, and it "challenges
feminist reformers to see the many ways in which a legal rule or claim
may influence norms regarding gender."93 The challenge remains
unmet, however, if the legal standard validates or ratifies a response
that increases the incidence of the original wrong.
Law has the potential to be "a system of incentives for encourag-
ing socially optimal behavior."94 It can balance short-term expedience
with long-term benefit and encourage conduct-even if it is not the
easiest, most risk-free choice at the time-that ultimately works to re-
duce the need for legal intervention.95 There is a justifiable reluc-
tance to expect more from women under oppressive circumstances,
and the suggestion that women should respond more constructively
can turn into "blaming the victim" in an instant. But we do women no
favors if we are afraid to encourage the behavior necessary to achieve
workplace equality.
I strongly disagree with the assumption that individual confronta-
tion of sexual harassment does little to reduce its frequency.96 It may
be easier to assume that women's agency is ineffective than to accept
the consequences of its effectiveness. But in the long term, we cannot
continue to work at cross-purposes by excusing women from exercis-
ing responsibility in response to sexual oppression. Women can, and
should, take responsibility-defined not as blame, but as the ability to
respond-in controlling inappropriate behavior in the workplace.
III. A NEw STANDARD OF RESPONSIBILITY
How should the law measure what is a responsible, rather than a
merely reasonable, response to sexually oppressive behavior? The first
mistake would be to assume that the answer would be the same for all
women, under all circumstances. This was the promise of partial
agency; it could have highlighted specific factual circumstances that
93 Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 353.
94 Abrams, Songs of Innocence, supra note 1, at 1555 n.83.
95 Discipline by lawsuit is an imperfect solution. It leads to hostility, ostracization,
and resentment in the workplace, and may be the least effective way of achieving
permanent change. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation
of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1215-16 (1989) [hereinafter Abrams, Gen-
der Discrimination].
96 See Abrams, Songs of Innocence, supra note 1, at 1548 (concluding that confron-
tation "would only address the coercive behavior in the individual case; it would do
little to mitigate the broader social problem").
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increased or decreased capacity for agency. Rather than risking judg-
ment of some women, however, partial agency ultimately assigned a
similarly limited agency to all women.
There seems to be an unresolvable conflict between the fear of
essentializing the experiences of women and the fear of not essential-
izing them. On the one hand, it is inappropriate to assume that all
women can be described in the same way-that a "unitary, 'essential'
women's experience can be isolated and described independently of
race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience" 97-
just because they are all women. On the other hand, failing to essen-
tialize women may be an even riskier proposition. If women are not
all the same, then we risk having to deal with the suggestion of greater
and lesser, better and worse, or superior and inferior.
This may have been the major stumbling block for the applica-
tion of partial agency theory to women's responses to sexual oppres-
sion. If certain groups or categories of women were thought to have a
greater capacity for agency, given their advantages or other supportive
circumstances, then these women would have a correspondingly
greater responsibility to confront sexual misconduct by men. Further-
more, the characterization of some women as stronger and less lim-
ited in their agency inevitably leaves some women weaker in
comparison. As a result, the question of essentialization balances on a
very thin edge. It is admirable to recognize the problems of essential-
ism, but it is not admirable to speculate too specifically on what those
problems might be.98 Partial agency, however, should find its greatest
strength in its willingness to be specific and not succumb to the easy
temptation of overstatement. Factual accuracy is not bad for women;
only factual inaccuracy is a danger.
A. Anti-Essentialism and Agency
If women differ in their capacity for agency with respect to sexual
misconduct by men, how should the difference be measured or de-
scribed? Writers who assume that women do in fact differ also assume
that they differ along the usual familiar lines of legal distinction. "By
arguing that the social meanings ascribed to gender affect most wo-
97 Harris, supra note 89, at 585.
98 Katherine Franke seems to wryly recognize this dilemma. See Katherine M.
Franke, Homosexuals, Torts, and Dangerous Things, 106 YALE LJ. 2661, 2675-76 (1997)
("The disclaimer provided at the end of the introduction reiterates, in a now familiar
fashion, what has come to be the familiar footnote to Kim Crenshaw's 'intersectional-
ity' article in almost every article written on feminist jurisprudence by a white
woman.").
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men in the same (strong) ways, ideological determination arguments
neglect the crucially diversifying influences of race, class and sexual
orientation."99
But what does that mean in any specific sense? How exactly do
we envision that these different groups of women differ in their re-
sponses to sexual misconduct? If "particular constraints may be spe-
cific to the circumstances of a group,"'00 what kinds of constraints are
we looking for? What kinds of groups are we looking for? Except with
respect to race and ethnicity, the idea of anti-essentialism has re-
mained almost entirely free of any specific factual content.
Angela Harris has suggested that black women can help feminism
move beyond its "fascination with essentialism"' 01 through factual ac-
counts demonstrating that women are not inevitably and uniformly
disadvantaged by diminished agency. "At the individual level, black
women have had to learn to construct themselves in a society that de-
nied them full selves."' 0 2 Factual specificity is once again the key, just
as it should have been for the most profitable application of partial
agency.' 0 3 "[N]arratives and stories, accounts of the particular, the
different, and the hitherto silenced"' 4-and the more detail the bet-
ter-can confront the enforced generality that tends to limit all wo-
men equally.
In contrast, there has been only the most tentative effort to de-
scribe an anti-essentialist viewpoint on how factors of class might affect
women's ability to respond constructively to sexual oppression. For
example, the question was raised anecdotally following the Anita Hill-
Clarence Thomas congressional hearings. Some writers have noted
that working-class women tended to disbelieve Anita Hill; they saw in
her behavior a reluctance to directly confront Thomas and just tell
99 Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, supra note 1, at 768; accord Abrams, Social
Construction, supra note 10, at 1035 (same distinctions). Compare Abrams, Ideology and
Women's Choices, supra note 1, at 799 (adding "family background" and "other individ-
ual factors"), with Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 1, at 531 (adding
factors of ethnicity, age, and "other dimensions" in the context of battered women),
and Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 435 (1996)
(adding factors of ethnicity, age, and cultural and religious beliefs, in the context of
reproductive choice).
100 Abrams, Songs of Innocence, supra note 1, at 1557.
101 Harris, supra note 89, at 612.
102 Id. at 613.
103 SeeAbrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, supra note 1, at 796-800 (advocating
complex, multi-causal explanations and narrative accounts).
104 Harris, supra note 89, at 615. See also id. at 585 ("contemporary legal theory
needs less abstraction and not simply a different sort of abstraction").
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him to "knock it off." This curious failure, in their view, to respond
effectively made her story suspect.
10 5
It is counterintuitive to suggest that the standard "essentialist" wo-
man-one privileged in class-should be classified as having relatively
diminished agency in response to sexual oppression. To the extent
that class-privileged women enjoy greater economic security, they
should also have an enhanced ability to challenge inappropriate be-
havior in the workplace. Sometimes the privileged woman is even
characterized as "domineering" and "aggressive," subject to "a stereo-
type that afflicts white, upper-middle-class professional women." 10 6
More commonly, however, professional women are characterized as
relatively diminished in agency; the workplace's "most vulnerable wo-
man" is not necessarily its least privileged.
10 7
Feminists have expressed concern that the "reasonable woman"
standard may be built on the skewed experiences of white, straight,
class-privileged professional women. The worry is that this essentialist
picture erases the perspectives of those who fail to fit the mold,1 08 but
the danger in the agency context may be something greater. If char-
acterizations of diminished agency are written to fit a narrow slice of
professional women who see themselves as having a particularly lim-
ited capacity to respond constructively to sexual misconduct, then the
bulk of women may be disadvantaged as a result. Not only are the
specific facts that make their perspectives distinctive eliminated, but
the generalities substituted for them are at odds with the agency they
are otherwise expected to exercise.
The picture of elite women as diminished in agency may be more
than just a picture; it may accurately reflect that elite women are in
fact disproportionately limited by a self-concept of diminished agency.
The well-known study of women law students at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at
105 See Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 1, at 566-67 n.193;
Abrams, Social Construction, supra note 10, at 1036.
106 Abrams, Social Construction, supra note 10, at 1037.
107 See id. at 1039; see also Abrams, Complex Claimants, supra note 1, at 349 (noting
that white, middle-class, heterosexual women are assumed to have little agency, while
women who are poor, non-white, or sexually nonconforming are assumed to have
full-and culpable-agency).
108 See Abrams, Social Construction, supra note 10, at 1036 ("One of the great risks
in going too far down the road toward the reasonable woman-at least, without assess-
ment of its potential costs-is that the reasonable woman will begin to sound a lot like
a white, straight, upper-middle-class professional, thereby excluding the perceptions
and experiences of a majority of women who actually occupy the workplace.").
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One Ivy League Law School,10 9 serves as a potential illustration. Interest-
ingly, it may also address another factor-sexual orientation-
thought to affect the degree of agency that it is reasonable to expect
women to exercise.
The authors did not intend Becoming Gentlemen to be a commen-
tary on women's agency; instead, they used the study's results to show
that women experienced law school in a way very different from their
male peers. The article, however, has much to say about women's
agency in the context of elite academic institutions and in the elite
profession of lawyering. Running through the article is example after
example of how incapacitated women students became in the face of
what they saw as sexually harassing comments from male students.
Many responded to men's inappropriate talk by deciding never again
to participate in classroom discussion, 110 even though that choice
would limit the quality of their legal education, and one woman al-
most dropped out of law school immediately."'
What goes unmentioned in Becoming Gentlemen, however, is that
the results can be explained more by homophobia and limited agency
than by any effect of sexual harassment. Almost without exception,
the women who withdrew from full participation in law school be-
cause of perceived sexual harassment had done so because a male stu-
dent had called them a lesbian. 112 To these elite, presumably straight
women, being called a lesbian by a childish classmate was a worse fate
than leaving law school with a subpar education; being called a lesbian
might justify giving up plans for a legal career. Apparently there is an
astonishing level of homophobia among the largely privileged stu-
dents at Penn, both men and women. Some men have discovered that
they can eliminate women as serious colleagues by using women's own
homophobia against them, and those women let them do it.
The diminished capacity of these women to respond construc-
tively to even minor forms of sexually harassing verbal behavior is
frightening.113 In a footnote, but only in a footnote, the authors ob-
109 Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League
Law Schoo4 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1994).
110 See id. at 43, 51-52.
111 See id. at 51 n.128.
112 See id. at 43 ("man-hating lesbian"), 51 n.128 ("man-hating lesbian"; "feminazi
dyke"), 52 ("feminazi dyke"). The specific words chosen by the male students are
important because they show just how ridiculous their behavior was. These were not
even statements seriously alleging that certain women were gay, for whatever that
would be worth; they were nothing but juvenile, immature, attention-getting displays.
113 Imagine if, as a future lawyer, one of these students was representing a female
client who was either thought to be gay or who was, in fact, actually gay. If someone
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serve that this limited agency may not be pertinent to the law school
education of nonelite women:
Note, however, the differences in the performance of working-class
and poor women who made it to law school.... These working-class
women had grown accustomed to challenging societally prescribed
roles during their struggle to gain admission to law school. Once
they were in law school, they were not about to give up. In other
words, these women had socialized themselves to be successful, ac-
tive participants who took charge of their education as they had
taken charge of the course of their lives and careers."
l 4
How can this be too much to ask of women of privilege? Femi-
nism, after all, "means never saying that women are, as a class,
idiots.""
5
B. Reconciling Women's Different Agencies
For the most part, anti-essentialism has failed to move beyond the
most superficial assertions of relevant difference. Factual complexity
is hidden rather than explored; we concede that "of course, women
differ from one another," but then retreat from any analysis of how
that difference might make some legal standards counterproductive
for some or even most women. A greater attention to the factual com-
plexity of life experience would help to fill out the standard anti-es-
sentialist distinctions of race, class, and sexual orientation.
With respect to class distinctions, for example, would military wo-
men be disadvantaged by agency assumptions written to compensate
for the more limited capacity of elite women to constructively con-
front the misconduct of men? Would women law students at nonelite
speculated that because she chose to represent this client, she might be gay also,
would she have to withdraw from representation?
114 Guinier et al., supra note 109, at 33-34 n.86. My own observations of women
law students as a teaching fellow at the University of Chicago Law School, an elite
institution, and as a junior professor at the University of Florida College of Law, a
non-elite institution, are consistent with this description of class differences.
One possible solution is greater diversity among the faculty, not in the more com-
mon race-based manner, but in economic background and educational pedigree. See
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Confess'n the Blues: Some Thoughts on Class Bias in Law School Hiing,
42J. LEGAL EDUC. 119 (1992).
115 Young, supra note 1, at 292 (capitalization deleted). Professor Young's criti-
cism of descriptions of women as limited in agency was motivated by her admiration
for the distinctly non-agency-limited women who attended law school at Ohio North-
ern University. See id. at 271 ("By far, the most important influence on my views is the
respect I have developed over the years for the extraordinary women who come to my
university to study law."). Not coincidentally, in my view, some of those extraordinary
women were military veterans. See id.
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institutions be disadvantaged by agency assumptions written to com-
pensate for the difficulty that female students at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School had in constructively confronting juvenile
behavior from young men? Becoming Gentlemen notes that this "peer
policing" by men deters women from actively participating in their
legal education;" 6 we could, hypothetically, choose to address wo-
men's limited agency in this area by no longer requiring active partici-
pation. Proposed solutions for sexual misconduct in the military are
analogous; we could choose to no longer expect women to object to
or report inappropriate conduct in the workplace. The question that
goes unasked is whether these choices contribute to, or alleviate, wo-
men's inequality.
These approaches to limited agency are right in that they main-
tain a primary focus on men, who are currently the primary source of
misconduct in either example. These approaches to limited agency,
however, are wrong in that they isolate a limited area of agency for
disparate treatment-women's agency with respect to the sexual mis-
conduct of men. This disparate treatment can be seen from two per-
spectives. First, women are assumed to exercise a generally full and
independent agency with respect to public-sphere activities and re-
sponsibilities, but not with respect to sexual activities and responsibili-
ties.117 Second, women are assumed to exercise a generally full and
independent agency even under conditions of inequality, but not
under conditions of inequality between women and men." 8 Taken
together, the central assumption of limited agency is that women have
116 Guinier et al., supra note 109, at 82-83.
117 We no longer assume, for example, that women lack capacity to contract. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
118 Anne Coughlin has drawn a close comparison between the "battered woman"
defense to homicide and the historical "marital coercion" defense raised on behalf of
women involved in criminal activity with their husbands. In both instances, the de-
fense "reinforces the understanding that women cannot overcome barriers to lawful
conduct, barriers that men can and do surmount." Coughlin, supra note 78, at 53.
The marital coercion defense excuses women's misconduct "on the ground that they
cannot be expected to, and, indeed, should not, resist the influence exerted by their
husbands." Id. at 5. She noted that no similar defense was afforded to others who
lived or worked under subordinating conditions. "[W]e notice that other
subordinated actors, such as children, servants, and soldiers, who were legally and so-
cially bound to obey the commands of their superiors, were not afforded a similar
excuse from punishment." Id. at 37 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Furthermore, other circumstances of inequality offer no excuse from responsibil-
ity under the law, such as economic or social disadvantage. "Life occurs under condi-
tions of inequality." Young, supra note 1, at 270.
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a diminished capacity to advance their own interests in interactions
with men when the subject is related to sex.
That extremely particularized view of women's limited agency
might be seen as positive because it avoids a more comprehensive in-
capacity that would apply to women more generally. In the long term,
however, reliance on this singular limitation may lead to the same re-
sult. The law of sexual harassment is intended to guard against sexu-
alization' 19 of women at work: the creation of an environment in
which women's sexuality becomes their most conspicuous characteris-
tic. 120 Respect for women is undermined, and equality is diminished,
when circumstances "suggest[ ] to women that their sexuality is their
most salient feature even in the workplace.'
21
We at least have to be alert to the possibility that we inadvertently
contribute to sexualization of the workplace when we identify women
as having a singular disability with respect to sexual agency. Partial
agency has selected out one specific capacity for responsible, construc-
tive conduct from all other capacities that women have for responsi-
ble, constructive conduct, deeming it uniformly diminished for all
women despite their individual circumstances. When partial agency is
tied to women as women rather than to factual circumstances that di-
minish or enhance the exercise of agency, women are disadvantaged.
But it would be just as inaccurate to assume that women enjoy
unrestricted agency-obviously we have yet to reach the day in which
women exercise equal influence and control, particularly in histori-
cally male-dominated institutions. The task, then, is to devise a stan-
dard that realistically reflects the agency that women do have, without
unnecessarily diminishing that agency in a way that is counterproduc-
tive to women's advancement. The best solution would not measure
agency simply by sex-men have more, women have less-or by sub-
ject matter-if it relates to sexual interaction, men have more, women
have less. The most productive approach would take into account the
surrounding factual context and attempt to make consistent the dif-
ferent agencies that women exercise; it would never validate behavior
that contributes to women's inequality in the long term.
Recall that responsibility is best viewed not as blame, but as the
ability to respond in a constructive manner-with constructiveness
measured by benefit to the actor who takes responsibility for her own
conduct, not the conduct of others. Ability to respond to workplace
119 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 18-23
(1979) (pioneering use of the term to describe women's workplace roles).
120 See Chamallas, supra note 39, at 116.
121 Abrams, Gender Discrimination, supra note 95, at 1211.
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misconduct of any variety is usually restricted by one's status or au-
thority in the workplace, and so any fair standard concerning sexual
misconduct would take into account that status and authority. To the
extent that a legal standard required that a woman's behavior in re-
sponse to sexual misconduct be in some respect reasonable, reasona-
bleness would be evaluated in the context of a woman's general
workplace duty and authority.
Proof of welcomeness issues in sexual harassment cases can serve
as an illustration. Rather than excusing all women from demonstrat-
ing unwelcomeness by direct objection or report because some wo-
men may not feel comfortable doing so, a court would inquire into
the plaintiff's general workplace duty and authority. Does the plain-
tiff, for example, have as a part of her duties a particular responsibility
to control and educate others concerning inappropriate sexual con-
duct in the workplace? Does her general authority give her the lati-
tude to confront misconduct and mistakes concerning work-related
tasks? If a plaintiff has neither the duty nor the authority to ever con-
front, for any reason, a particular colleague or superior, then it may
be reasonable under the law to expect her to respond to sexual mis-
conduct in an indirect or ineffective way.
Returning to the earlier detailed description of the professional
responsibilities of Air Force missile launch officers, it would be
counterproductive to excuse women missileers from responding con-
structively-responsibly-to inappropriate sexual conduct in the
workplace. The Air Force expects and requires direct confrontation
by its missileers when the stakes are much more significant; it would
be inconsistent to assume that women lose that capacity to confront
when the improper behavior is sexual misconduct. Furthermore, mili-
tary officers (and enlisted supervisors as well) have a duty to control
and educate others concerning sexual misconduct, not only for their
own benefit but also for the benefit of the women they command and
supervise. It would undermine the status of these military women to
excuse them from responsible behavior that the military would other-
wise expect without question.
In one sense, this reworked standard of reasonableness is similar
to the original intent of partial agency. It characterizes women as
neither wholly unrestricted or wholly incapacitated; it identifies cir-
cumstances under which women can effectively exercise agency
against sexual oppression. Where this new conception of reasonable-
ness differs is in its elimination of generalized assumptions of incapac-
ity that are solely based on sex. It replaces those assumptions with the
expectation that women can, and must, constructively respond to in-
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appropriate behavior in the workplace, to the extent of their duty and
authority.
Other writers have considered whether it is reasonable to expect
women to directly confront inappropriate sexual behavior by men,
but only in the context of explaining why it is almost always unreason-
able. Some of that suspicion is directed toward the concept of wo-
men's agency itself-the fundamental concern that if women are
portrayed as having the capacity of choice, then some women will in-
evitably make poor choices. But even under circumstances in which
women might fairly be viewed as exercising sufficient agency, there is
a reluctance to encourage constructive confrontation by women. Not
because more direct ways of responding to sexual harassment are inef-
fective means of controlling sexual harassment-the opposite is likely
true-but because a woman who directly confronts misconduct "acts
like a man," and that in itself is objectionable.
C. Why the Feminist Accusation of "Acting Like a Man" Is
Always Counterproductive
There may be no more counterproductive feminist criticism than
the charge that there is something wrong with a woman's behavior
that is perfectly feasible, responsible, and constructive, simply because
she is "acting like man." 122 The following criticism of the hypothetical
woman who responds directly and effectively to sexual harassment is a
typical example: "Such a woman complains in a way that effectively
stops the harassment. Such a woman does not suffer in silence or
confide only in other women. In short, the 'reasonable woman' is
very much a man."
123
What is surprising about much of this commentary is how it seem-
ingly seeks to freeze traditional sex-role behaviors as they are, failing
to recognize that not all behavior more typical of women is good and,
122 Joan Williams long ago identified this distinctly unhelpful way of criticizing
women who fail to conform. Her observations would be particularly accurate in the
context of military women:
[S]ome relational feminists explicitly police the stereotype of women they
advocate by calling "male-identified" any feminist who disagrees with their
characterization of women.... This kind of gender-policing epithet, paral-
lel to the Victorian use of the word "unladylike," makes explicit the assump-
tion that women who do not speak in "women's voice" are somehow not
"real" women. Note also that part of the power of the modem epithet
"male-identified" is its assertion that a woman without "women's voice" is a
man.
Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 813 n.61 (1989).
123 Estrich, supra note 49, at 846.
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correspondingly, not all behavior more typical of men is bad.124 Stere-
otypical extremes of female-identified and male-identified behaviors
are presented as the only options available for women to adopt, set-
ting the stage for criticism of courts who would withhold a remedy for
either choice. Consider the situation in which a woman responds to
sexually offensive behavior in the workplace by behaving in a sexually
offensive manner herself:
Moreover, even in cases where the working environment is re-
garded as abusive from an objective standpoint, evidence that the
plaintiff's actions contributed to the sexually offensive atmosphere is likely
to disqualify the plaintiff ... In one case, the court discounted an
entry in the plaintiff's diary indicating that she was offended by her
co-worker's sexually abusive behavior towards her. Because the
plaintiff herself had behaved abusively on occasion, she was deemed to
have "welcomed" similar behavior. This "clean hands" approach
means that a plaintiff who belatedly realizes that she cannot safely
behave like "one of the boys" is likely to have no legal recourse for
subsequent harassment.' 25
Rather than designating the plaintiff's conduct as "behaving like
one of the boys," it would be more constructive to designate it as "be-
having inappropriately," "behaving unprofessionally," or "behaving of-
fensively." The plaintiff loses a remedy not because she is being
punished for trying to act like a man, but beca use she contributed to a
sexually offensive working environment through her own behavior.
She loses a remedy not because those who behave in "masculine" ways
"cannot be harmed by sexually abusive remarks,"' 26 but because plain-
tiffs who behave in immature and offensive ways cannot recover dam-
ages for harm to which they contributed.
But what if a woman merely seeks to "fit in' byjoining in sexually
offensive behavior in the workplace? 127 That is certainly a choice that
could be made; however, there are potential consequences to that
choice. Women who engage in sexually inappropriate conduct in the
workplace, even for the best of purposes, contribute to an atmosphere
124 See SANDRA LiPsrrz BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON
SEXUAL INEQUALrrY 131 (1993) ("[F]lesh-and-blood women and men aren't all as
good and evil, respectively, nor as homogeneous, as the woman-centered discourse
seems to imply.").
125 Chamallas, supra note 50, at 809 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
126 Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggre-
gation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 93 (1995).
127 See Radford, supra note 50, at 538-39.
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that fosters continuing and escalating harassment against women.1 28
It is, sadly, the lazy way of gaining favor in a male-dominated environ-
ment, one which does nothing to educate men and ultimately harms
women. As with the standard of reasonableness, the law should not
validate behavior that, in the long term, contributes to the subordina-
tion of women.
The other choice that plaintiffs purportedly have in this polarized
world is, not surprisingly, to "act like a woman." The complaint is that
these women fare no better under the law, even though they have
complied with sex-role expectations. But when one looks more closely
at what it means to act like a woman, one finds behavior that is either
ineffective or dysfunctional in responding to sexual harassment.
"Milder and more passive behaviors (those typically associated with
women) are likely to be viewed by courts as 'ambiguous' and thus not
always positive evidence on the issue of unwelcomeness."129
The choices presented to women, therefore, are only two: behave
in an extreme and stereotypically masculine fashion (offensively or
unprofessionally) or behave in an extreme and stereotypically femi-
nine fashion (ineffectively or dysfunctionally). Both may tend to re-
sult in findings of welcomeness, but they are unrepresentative of the
range of choices available. Behaving like a woman, unfortunately,
never seems to include behaving constructively, even when construc-
tive behavior may be an option. For a woman to directly express an
objection to a man's conduct, for example, is considered a "[Clint]
Eastwood-style response" and not "socially plausible."'30 An expecta-
tion of "blunt objection" by women is dismissed as "stark" only be-
cause the behavior is more characteristic of men. 31
There has recently been an uncomfortable trend in feminist legal
writing which advocates legal protection for conduct considered "fem-
inine"-behavior traditionally more characteristic of women than of
128 But see Chamallas, supra note 50, at 810 (criticizing the "no participation [in
wrongdoing] requirement" because "recovery will be limited to women who resist and
who are willing to risk escalation of harassment either by complaining or by refusing
to conform to the community norm"). It is unlikely that women reduce the risk of
escalation of sexual harassment by making their own additional contribution of sexu-
ally offensive behavior to the workplace.
129 Radford, supra note 50, at 524. See also Estrich, supra note 49, at 829 (arguing
that sexual harassment law "penalizes the woman who does not act like a man," but
describing a plaintiff who behaved dysfunctionally at every turn by not objecting to,
complaining about, or declining involvement in an ongoing relationship); id. at
830-31 (describing plaintiffs "who act like most women-who act 'friendly,' or dress
stylishly, or keep silent" in response to sexual harassment).
130 Abrams, Songs of Innocence, supra note 1, at 1548.
131 Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 1, at 363.
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men. These writers see a "danger of substituting for prohibited sex
discrimination a still acceptable gender discrimination, that is to say,
discrimination against the stereotypically feminine, especially when
manifested by men, but also when manifested by women." 13 2 Under
this viewpoint, employers could not, as a general rule, make employ-
ment decisions that disadvantaged women who behaved in a stere-
otypically feminine manner; this would constitute sex discrimination
as much as a policy that excluded women on the basis of their biologi-
cal sex. "Discrimination against the feminine is likely to have a dispa-
rate impact on women, who are disproportionately likely to be
feminine and not masculine; it should be permitted only ifjob-related
and justified by business necessity."'133
What is missing from this analysis, however, is the recognition
that not all traditional characteristics historically associated with wo-
men will be productive or functional in a given setting. Some tradi-
tionally feminine behaviors may be distinctly dysfunctional under
some circumstances, yet these writers recommend that the law protect
these behaviors simply because women are more likely to engage in
them. It is true that a standard which favors a traditionally masculine
characteristic will disproportionately exclude women, at least for the
present. If that masculine characteristic, however, is a positive and
functional trait under the circumstances, it is counterproductive for
the law to discourage women from adopting it only because it is more
common in men.
We must get beyond the feminist assumption that anything that is
traditionally male is inappropriate for women or that anything tradi-
tionally female is worth protecting under the law.134 Almost twenty-
132 Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender From Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and FeministJurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1995). See also
Franke, supra note 126, at 95 ("Any adverse action in the workplace on account of a
person's gender should be cognizable under Title VII, regardless of the body parts of
the plaintiff or the defendant.").
These works build on the earlier "acceptance" model of equality theory advanced
by Christine Littleton. "On this view, the function of equality is to make gender dif-
ferences, perceived or actual, costless relative to one another, so that anyone may
follow a male, female, or androgynous lifestyle according to their natural inclination
or choice without being punished for following a female lifestyle or rewarded for
following a male one." Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L.
REv. 1279, 1297 (1987).
133 Case, supra note 132, at 4.
134 Kathryn Abrams has recognized that traditionally feminine traits are not uni-
formly beneficial for women: "I readily acknowledge that some of these socially con-
structed characteristics, such as deference or passivity, are qualities that are
unproductive for women, and that women might never have chosen for themselves
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five years ago, the psychological research of Sandra Bern135 demon-
strated that "androgynous" women and men-people with strengths
in both feminine and masculine domains-had the greatest range of
abilities to respond effectively under changing circumstances. For ex-
ample, the androgynously gifted might be similarly skilled at standing
firm against an opposing group or at nurturing children and others in
need.136 "Androgyny provides both a vision of utopia and a model of
mental health that does not require the individual to banish from the
self whatever attributes and behaviors the culture may have stereotypi-
cally defined as inappropriate for his or her sex."
137
had they been able to construct the social order." Abrams, Gender Discrimination,
supra note 95, at 1194 n.47. She put off for another time, though, the question of
whether feminist theory might unintentionally, but counterproductively, reward such
dysfunctional behavior in women. "Learning to identify and advance these [positive]
values, without embracing those that are less desirable is no doubt a perilous task."
Id.
135 Professor Bem developed the Bern Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI), a paper-and-
pencil test that measures a subject's self-description of traditionally feminine and tra-
ditionally masculine qualities. Subjects rate themselves along a Likert scale ranging
from one ("never or almost never true") to seven ("always or almost always true") on
60 personality traits, one-third considered more desirable in women (the "Femininity
scale"), one-third considered more desirable in men (the "Masculinity scale"), and
one-third considered gender-neutral. See Sandra L. Bem, The Measurement of Psycholog-
ical Androgyny, 42 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 155, 156-59 (1974).
Bern was one of the first to recognize that traditional masculinity and femininity
were not either-or concepts. Although most of her subjects were "sex-typed," with a
gender either primarily masculine or feminine (but not necessarily in the expected
direction), a substantial minority scored as "androgynous," with relatively little differ-
ence in their self-descriptions of masculine and feminine traits. See id. at 161 tbl.7.
136 See BEM, supra note 124, at 156-57.
137 Id. at 124. Not surprisingly, Professor Bern's work has drawn criticism from
those invested in preserving more protected roles for women. See, e.g., Jill M.
Dahlmann, Book Review, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1929 (1994) (reviewing BEM, supra
note 124) (describing some of Bem's commentary as "unoriginal" and "outdated").
Some have objected to the concept of androgyny because it disregards existing gen-
der inequality and makes no effort to increase the value of female-identified traits or
decrease the value of male-identified traits. See BEM, supra note 124, at 123. There is
nothing inherent in being female- or male-identified, however, that warrants value in
and of itself. For example, some of the personality characteristics rated in the BSRI
Femininity scale are dysfunctional in adults: "childlike," "flatterable," and "gullible."
All the Masculinity scale characteristics, however, are functional under at least some,
if not most, circumstances. Cf Case, supra note 132, at 22-23 and fig.2 (criticizing
"acceptable androgyny" as being more masculine than feminine). Some examples of
the BSRI masculine characteristics that would be most constructive in responding to
sexual harassment, for example, are "assertive," "defends own beliefs," "independent,"
or "willing to take a stand." See Bem, supra note 135, at 156 tbl.1. Nonetheless, critics
assert that "androgyny is theorized at too private and too personal a level to be of any
value politically." BEM, supra note 124, at 123. This theme is familiar in the way it
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Tenacious policing by feminists of what it means to be a "real
woman" has, ironically, reinforced the same categorical, frozen-in-
time portrayals of women that feminists once worked to eliminate.
For all of its emphasis on a woman's unique ability to transcend the
artificial polarities that men are said to invent, the woman-centered
perspective has so completely polarized women and men, along
with what it defines as the male and female modes of relating to
reality, that for all practical purposes, both men and women are as
limited by homogenized visions of themselves as ever before.138
This restrictive*mindset is particularly counterproductive in any
examination of the role of military women. Military service has tradi-
tionally embraced characteristics that are also traditionally identified
with men. Some of these male-identified traits are dysfunctional in
the modem, sex-integrated military, to be sure, but many are func-
tional and, indeed, necessary for effective performance. To suggest
that feminine, but dysfunctional, behavioral counterparts should be
equated with productive, but masculine, traits in order that gender
characteristics be treated alike only guarantees that military women
will be second-class servicemembers.
An example helps illustrate the problem. All young officers, men
and women alike, are taught the importance of developing what is
called "command presence." Command presence is an overall bear-
ing or demeanor that speaks of influence, persuasiveness, trust, knowl-
edge, and responsibility. It is that ability to arrest the attention of
subordinates, to have them believe you know what you are doing, and
to motivate them to perform their duties in the best way they can.
Command presence comes across in voice, in posture, and in word
choice, but not necessarily in size or maleness.
Some are suspicious of characteristics like command presence,
believing them to be surrogates for more obvious ways of excluding
women from certain fields.'3 9 A theory advocating equal acceptance
of gendered traits would conclude, for example, that women who
adopt a higher-than-biologically-necessary pitch to their voice should
not be disadvantaged for a choice that women will make more often
discourages women's potential. Direct objection to sexual harassment is also deval-
ued under the unfortunate assumption that the responses of individual women are
ineffective in remedying the problem. See Abrams, Songs of Innocence, supra note 1, at
1548.
138 BEM, supra note 124, at 130-31.
139 SeeAbrams, GenderDiscrimination, supra note 95, at 1189 ("These [male] norms
shape intangibles such as the 'appropriate' professional demeanor: the tone of voice,
air of command. .. ."); see also Case, supra note 132, at 92 (describing "officer bear-
ing" as a masculine criterion for the selection of civilian police officers).
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than men. Women are more likely than men to adopt a deferential or
subservient tone of speaking voice; therefore, to require a use of voice
that is deep within a woman's or a man's biological range, is steady
and not rushed, and has volume rather than softness, would dispro-
portionately exclude women and be impermissible.
140
Legal protection of stereotypically feminine and deferential
voices, however, would work to the detriment of military women who
must capture the attention and trust of others. Women lawyers face
similar issues. Lawyers whose voices trail off into uncertainty, whose
sentences end on their highest note, or whose statements squeak in
nervousness, will not be as persuasive or effective.1 41 Insisting that
gendered ways of speaking be accorded equal status in the courtroom
would be a wasted exercise that fails to advance the status of women; a
dysfunctional trait does not become a functional one by theoretical
fiat.
As with the theory of partial agency, women are best served by
analyses that are factually complex and not superficially extreme. We
should identify and legally defend substantive, a42 productive strengths
140 See Case, supra note 132, at 28-30 (analyzing the gendered, rather than biolog-
ical, aspects of voice as a subject of sex discrimination).
141 In my observation, female law students are disproportionately more likely to
have certain types of problems with professional demeanor in classroom participa-
tion; male law students are disproportionately more likely to have different types of
demeanor issues. Students who giggle in nervousness, for example, are almost always
women; students who turn into the class clown when they are nervous are almost
always men. It is important to help modify the behavior of both.
142 Equal-acceptance theories may be especially harmful to women when they em-
phasize legal protection for the most superficial of stereotypically feminine traits. See,
e.g., Case, supra note 132, at 3, 68-70 (advocating equal protection for instances of
superficial femininity such as the wearing of "frilly pink dresses," jewelry, and
makeup). See Katharine Bartlett's analysis of workplace dress and appearance stan-
dards recognized that stereotypically feminine dress may itself contribute to the sub-
ordination of women. Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and
Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 Micm. L. REV. 2541,
2555-56 (1994).
It is a sign of the pervasiveness of gender coding in the symbolic system of
dress and appearance that few female-associated dress or appearance con-
ventions exist that are not linked with stereotypes about women that
emerged from or have been interwoven with their historically inferior status.
Courts should find all such conventions discriminatory "on the basis of sex,"
unless narrowly tailored to sex differences in ways that do not perpetuate
this historically inferior status.
Id. at 2570. An interesting comparison results: if an employer mandates stereotypi-
cally feminine dress for its female employees, the requirement should be struck down
because it contributes to the subordination of women, but if women choose to dress
in a stereotypically feminine manner, their choices should be favored over an em-
[VOL- 74:1
WOMEN, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE MILITARY
that are traditi6nally female-identified without unnecessarily excusing
women from also adopting male-identified productive qualities. Mary
Anne Case has described how the Los Angeles Police Department dis-
covered that female officers were disproportionately more likely to
have "interpersonal skills, sensitivity, politeness, and the ability to
communicate," and that systematic underevaluation of these very ef-
fective policing skills resulted in unfairly low performance ratings for
women.1
43
It overstates an extremely good point, however, to then question
whether "aggressiveness is a useful quality in a police officer" or con-
clude "how much more effective feminine qualities are than mascu-
line qualities in the work of the police."144 It is not an either-or
proposition. Police officers-or military servicemembers' 45-with the
broadest range of productive skills will always be the most valuable,
and it is counterproductive to condescendingly shield women from
requirements that will encourage them to incorporate those skills-
even the skills that are considered traditionally masculine.
It is much more productive to first determine which traits, behav-
iors, or strengths should be valued in a given circumstance-regard-
less of gender association-and then make certain that the law
defends individuals-regardless of sex-who have achieved those
ployer's desire for a more neutral appearance, even though their dress contributes to
the subordination of women.
Women's dress is a curiously sensitive issue. There is an uncomfortableness with
women in traditionally male clothing that parallels feminists' uncomfortableness with
women who display traditionally male strengths. "A female marine who considers
herself a professional will seem frivolous, decorative, and flighty if she wears a dress or
skirt, but when she wears the male uniform she may be perceived as dressing up like a
man and thus either silly or sexy." Id. at 2550. This view of military women baffles
me. Whether she wears a uniform combination that includes a skirt or a pair of pants,
as long as the uniform style is appropriate for the duty performed, a military woman's
appearance is never frivolous or silly-except if one views the idea of a woman in the
military by itself as frivolous or silly. I cannot think of a single circumstance in which
requiring women to wear a pair of pants on the job would be considered "stigma-
tizing" for women. See id. at 2572. During World War II, there was a similar anxiety
about masculine-and functional-work attire for women that lead to a preoccupa-
tion with issues of superficial femininity: the skirt-pants dilemma, hairstyles, and fash-
ion accessories to uniforms. See MEYER, supra note 15, at 152-56.
143 See Case, supra note 132, at 85-94.
144 Id. at 88.
145 Professor Case cites with approval the LAPD recommendation to discontinue
recruitment of police officers at military bases in favor of locales with higher percent-
ages of women, such as day-care centers. See id. at 90 & n.315. This recommendation,
however, ignores the likelihood that women suited to police work in the now-pre-
ferred androgynous style would be hugely over-represented among military women.
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characteristics. Joan Williams describes this as "sex neutrality" rather
than "gender neutrality," an approach that "refus [es] to reinforce the
traditional assumption that adherence to gender roles flows 'natu-
rally' from biological sex."1 4 6 It provides room to question whether
the norms of certain occupations should be re-examined to remove
ineffective, gendered expectations that achieve little but the exclusion
of women, but it will not excuse women from expectations simply be-
cause they were once associated with men.
CONCLUSION
Catharine MacKinnon has been the most prominent advocate of
the "anti-subordination" approach to equal treatment for women
under the law. 147 This approach eliminates the sometimes wasteful
legal exercise of determining whether women are truly different from
men in some relevant way, or whether that difference justifies differ-
ent treatment under the law, all in an effort to decide whether a par-
ticular legal distinction constitutes sex discrimination. Professor
MacKinnon's anti-subordination analysis cuts effectively right to the
heart of the matter. No matter how rational, justified, or explainable
a policy or practice might be, the only appropriate question to ask is
whether it "contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a de-
prived position because of gender status.' 4 8 If the law in its effect will
contribute to the subordination of women, it should constitute sex
discrimination. In other words, the ends are much more important
than the means; the result is much more important than the
justification.
We should follow the same guidelines in evaluating feminist legal
theory. This is where the weakness of partial agency lies, in its disre-
gard for the effect of the theory as applied. Partial agency's justifica-
tion has become more important than its result; its short-term benefit
more important than its long-term consequence. Every time the law
reduces its expectations for constructive, responsible behavior from
women, we may take small steps forward by winning a few lawsuits but
still take large steps back from equality. The only question to be
asked, then, is whether intentional descriptions of women as agency-
146 Williams, supra note 122, at 839.
147 See MACKINNON, supra note 119, at 116-18; CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Differ-
ence and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscouRsES ON
LIFE AND LAw 32-45 (1987).
148 MACKINNON, supra note 119, at 117. See also id. ("The social problem ad-
dressed is not the failure to ignore woman's essential sameness with man, but the
recognition of womanhood to women's comparative disadvantage.").
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diminished will ultimately contribute to the subordination of women.
With respect to military women, it will, and we should reconsider the
effect it will have for women in general.
46 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:1
